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The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and 
looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that 
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properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where 
reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family 
constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child 
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be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium. 
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￿ Let us assume that men enter the labor market at about
the age of twenty. They work for forty-￿ve years or so and
then live for ￿fteen years in retirement. Naturally, ... men
will want to consume less than they produce in their working
years so that they can consume something in the years when
they produce nothing. ...
If there were only Robinson Crusoe, he would hope
to put by some durable goods which could be drawn on in his
old age. He would, so to speak, want to trade with Mother
Nature current consumption goods in return for future con-
sumption goods. ...
For the present purpose, I shall make the extreme
assumption that nothing will keep at all. Thus no intertem-
poral trade with Nature is possible. If Crusoe were alone, he
would obviously die at the beginning of his retirement years.
But we live in a world where new generations are
always coming along. ... [C]annot men during their produc-
tive years give up some of their product to bribe other men to
support them in their retirement years?￿(Samuelson, 1958)
The answer to Paul Samuelson￿ s question is clearly "yes, if there are
ways of ensuring that the bribed person will deliver his side of the deal
when the time comes". Samuelson￿ s own solution to this enforcement
problem is what he calls ￿ social contrivances￿ : contract law and its
associated legal enforcement apparatus, money that ￿ gives workers of
one epoch a claim on workers of a later epoch￿(Samuelson, 1958). But
what about the very young? They need support too, indeed more than
the old because, unlike them, they have not had an earlier phase of
life in which to put by durable goods. Therefore, if anyone is willing
to be ￿ bribed￿ , it is precisely them. The problem is that Samuelson￿ s
contrivances are not much help here. In most legal systems, the minors
are not allowed to enter into binding commercial agreements (and babies
could not anyway). Why is there no mention of them in Samuelson￿ s
analysis? As Martin Shubick perceptively put it,
￿ ... Samuelson￿ s model is implicitly a three period model
where he dropped the ￿rst period by the assumption that
child support was to be purely instinctive and hence not in
the analysis￿(Shubick, 1981).
The same implicit assumption underlies much of the subsequent lit-
erature on the subject, including some of the articles referred to in this
2Chapter. The basis for making such an assumption, one may suppose,
is that successful animal species are genetically programmed to care for
their o⁄spring. But is that enough? The existence of laws and social
norms deputed to ensure that children get adequate support suggests
that it may not. This does not necessarily mean that parents do not
care about their children, but it does imply that externalities, or some
other kind of coordination failure, could be responsible for at least some
of the parents giving their children less than is socially desirable. Even
Gary Becker, the economist most closely identi￿ed with the view that
parental transfers to children are gifts, uses the argument that parents
may underinvest in their children to explain public intervention.
￿ State intervention in the provision of education and other
human capital could raise investments in children to the e¢ -
cient level. ... The compulsory schooling laws in the United
States that began in the 1880s ... tended to have this e⁄ect.
A state usually set minimum requirements at a level that was
already exceeded by all but the poorest families in the state.
These laws raised the schooling of poor children but did not
tend to a⁄ect the schooling of other children￿(Becker and
Murphy, 1988).
In the present paper, we review the literature that examines the scope
for mutually bene￿cial intergenerational cooperation, and attempts to
theoretically explain the emergence of certain norms and institutions as
a rational response to the coordination problems we have just outlined.
Throughout the exposition, we take the life-cycle to consist of three
periods, labelled i = 0;1;2. A person is said to be young in period 0,
adult in period 1, old in period 2. Adults are able to produce income,
and to reproduce; the young and the old can do neither. Each adult
is endowed with a certain earning capacity, and with the potential to
have children (up to an unspeci￿ed physiological maximum, generally
assumed to be inconsequential) by bearing a ￿xed cost for each child,
p. This cost includes the child￿ s subsistence consumption in period 0
(above-subsistence consumption is a choice variable), as well as all the
expenditures and opportunity costs associated with childbearing. We
adopt the convention of calling t the generation that enters period 1 of
its life at date t. As individuals are active in that period only, this has
the expositional advantage of making the date of the action coincide
with the generational label of the actor.
32 A normative benchmark
Before embarking on an analysis of the institutions that might make it
possible for members of a generation to cooperate with members of an-
other generation, it is useful to establish a normative benchmark against
which to measure the performance of any such arrangement. In this sec-
tion, we approach the issue under the assumption that capital is the only
durable good, and that all members of the same generation are the same
(these assumptions will be relaxed in later sections).






















i denotes consumption in the i-th period of life (i = 0;1;2) of a
member of generation t. The function ui (:) is assumed to be concave,
with ui (0) = 0, and u0
i (0) = 1.







where kt, yt and nt denote, respectively, the capital, income and num-
ber of children of each member of generation t (or, equivalently, capital,
income and fertility per adult at date t), and f (:) is the per-adult pro-
duction function. Assuming a small open economy, and perfect capital
mobility, the interest rate, rt ￿ 1, is exogenously given.
























where dt is per-adult foreign debt, and nt the fertility rate, at date t. As
already mentioned, p is a positive constant, representing the unavoidable
part of the cost of a child. Since this constant will include the subsistence
part of a young child￿ s consumption, the variable c
t+1
0 is to be interpreted
as the above-subsistence consumption of a child born at t.1






t; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1: (4)
If ￿ is equal to unity, society is concerned with the average utility of
its present and future members as suggested by John Stuart Mill. By
1We could similarly introduce constants representing subsistence consumption in
periods 1 and 2 of a person￿ s life, and de￿ne ct
i as above-subsistence consumption
in the i-th period of life by a person born at t ￿ 1, but that would serve no useful
purpose.
4extension, we shall then call (4) the Millian welfare function, and the
(ct
i;nt)t=1;2::: sequence that maximizes it, subject to (3) for each t,2 the
Millian optimum.
Given (c0











































for every t ￿ 0.
The ￿rst of these conditions, (5), determines kt as a function of rt.3
The second one, (6), equates the marginal rate of substitution of present
for future consumption of children and adults to each other, and to the
current interest factor. The third one, (7), equates the social bene￿t of
adding another person to generation t+1 to the social cost. The former
is the adult consumption equivalent of the contribution that a member










nt. The latter is the sum of the expenditure required to





, and of the cost of endowing the future adult with net assets
(kt+1 ￿ dt+1) at date t + 1.
Notice that (5)￿(6) are the necessary conditions for a Pareto-optimal
allocation of consumption across generations of given size. If the popu-
lation pro￿le were exogenously given, and given that all members of the
same generation are assumed to be the same, Pareto and Millian opti-
mum would coincide. Since fertility is endogenous, however, there is an
e¢ cient allocation for each possible population pro￿le. Out of all these
pro￿les and associated consumption allocations, society favours the one











2There is also the constraint that, for each t, nt cannot be less than zero, or
greater than a certain physiological maximum. In reality, these restrictions may well
be binding for some women, but average fertility is always inside the limits. Since,
in our analysis, all women are the same, we follow the common pratice of assuming
that these restrictions are not binding at the optimum.
3This implies that any gap between domestic investment and domestic saving is
￿lled by a change in the foreign debt.
5The left-hand side of this expression is the return that a member of
generation t will get, at date t + 1, from the birth of a child at date t.
At a Millian optimum, this return is equal to the interest factor.
















is the number of persons in generation t. If ￿ = 1, (9) , society is con-
cerned with the sum of the utilities of its present and future members
as suggested by Jeremy Bentham. Stretching things a bit, we shall then
call the (ct
i;nt)t=1;2::: sequence that maximizes (9), subject to (3) for each
t, the ￿ Benthamite optimum￿ .
Given (c0
0;d0;k0), a Benthamite optimum satis￿es (5) ￿ (6) like a



















for every t ￿ 0. Compared with (7), the social bene￿t of adding a




adult consumption equivalent for a member of generation t of the value
that society attaches to an extra member of generation t + 1 per se
(that is to say, irrespective of the e⁄ect that this person will have on the
consumption of existing members of society).
Taken together with the second equation in (6), (11) implies that,











In the positive analysis of fertility behaviour, it is often assumed that
parents are altruistic, in the sense that they derive direct utility from the
consumption or utility of each of their children. That is the case in most
of Gary Becker￿ s contributions to the ￿eld. In a number of studies, it is
assumed that parents derive utility only from the number of children. As
an alternative to (1), let us then assume that the utility of each member






















t+1; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1; (13)
6where ￿ is a measure of parental altruism (in some formulations, this is
assumed to be a decreasing function of nt).
This implies that a person￿ s utility is ultimately a function of the
fertility and lifetime consumption of all her descendents.4 In particular,





























j=1 n is the number of this person￿ s adult descendents
at date t. Since (14) is e⁄ectively a Benthamite welfare function, it
would make little sense to de￿ne social welfare as the sum or the mean
of the maximands of successive generations. Having assumed that all
individuals are the same, it seems more natural to postulate that ￿ is
equal to the common ￿, and thus to identify W t with Ut. The conditions
for a social optimum are then (5) ￿ (6) and (11).
Positive economists generally regard social optimality as a tall order,
and limit themselves to looking for the possibility of a Pareto optimum.
The latter, however, applies only to a world without endogenous fertility,
because the Paretian criterion allows us to compare only allocations to
a given set of individuals. It cannot be applied to a situation where
the number of future adults is determined or conditioned by actions
taken by current adults. To deal with such a situation, Baland and
Robinson (2002) propose a quasi-Paretian criterion according to which
an allocation x is deemed preferable to an allocation y if the utility of the
parent, and the average utility of the children, is higher in x than in y.
The reference to an average level of utility leaves the door open for the
possibility that the number of children associated with x is di⁄erent from
the number associated with y. It thus allows us to make comparisons
across di⁄erent population pro￿les. A necessary condition for e¢ ciency
in the Baland-Robinson sense is that the marginal rate of substitution
of present for future consumption is the same for the parent￿ s and the
children￿ s generation.
3 The market
Are there institutions that can generate a (Millian or Benthamite) social
optimum, or at least allocate resources e¢ ciently? In the present sec-
tion, we assume that individual decisions are coordinated by competitive
markets. In later ones, we shall look at the role of the family, and of the
state.
4That would not be the case, notice, if parents derived utility from the con-
sumption, rather than the utility, of their childen. For an analysis of that case, see
Kollmann (1997).
7At any date t, income per adult, yt, is determined by (2), and the
















3.1 A life-cycle model
Standard life-cycle theory assumes that everyone is out for himself. The
young support themselves by borrowing. Adults save for their own old
age. The old live o⁄ their savings. The population pro￿le is exogenous.
Consider a simple Modigliani-like economy where each member of gen-
eration t chooses her consumption stream (ct
0;ct
1;ct
2) so as to maximize





























Since this is true for every t, (18) implies (6). The market equilibrium
is then a Pareto optimum conditional on the exogenously given popula-
tion pro￿le. In reality, however, credit may be rationed. Where adults
are concerned, this may re￿ ect an adverse selection problem (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). Where the young are concerned, there is also the problem
that minors cannot enter into legally binding agreements. If credit is
rationed for anybody, (6) does not hold, and the equilibrium is not a
Pareto optimum.
If fertility is a choice variable, there is a further and much bigger
problem. Since a child costs her parent at least p, but yields no bene￿t,
fertility will be zero. The economy will then vanish with generation 0.
This is a rather extreme instance of a population externality. Atomistic
agents ignore the social bene￿t ￿the di⁄erence between the left-hand
side and the last two right-hand-side terms of either (7) or (11) ￿of
putting an extra person into the world.5
5Further externalities emerge if we drop the small closed economy assumption,
or allow for non-reproducible resource constraints. See, for example, Eckstein and
Wolpin (1985), Michel and Pestieau (1993), Razin and Sadka (1995).
83.2 A dynastic model
One way to make fertility choice compatible with a pure market economy
and, at the same time, get round the problem that the young cannot sup-
port themselves by borrowing from the market, is to assume, like Becker
and Barro (1988), that adults get direct utility not only from their own
lifetime consumption, but also from the utility of each of their children
("descending altruism"). In this model, each dynasty behaves like an
in￿nite-lived individual, and the actions of this myriad of synthetic indi-
viduals are coordinated by the market just like those of ordinary mortals
in life-cycle theory.
At date 0, a0 is given, and c0
0 a bygone. Each current adult then







t=0;1::: that maximizes (13),




























j=1 rj￿1 is the capitalization factor from date 0 to date t,
and to two further restrictions for every t ￿ 0.














nt ￿ 0; (20)
says that an elderly parent cannot make negative transfers to her adult
children. This follows from (a) the assumption that people are altruistic
towards their children, but not towards their parents, and (b) the legal
















says that an adult and her young children are jointly allowed to borrow
no more than bt.




0;a1), of the dynastic plan. Once the ￿rst tranche is
implemented, however, what is left of the plan is optimal also for each




0;a2), and so on.
Becker and Barro (1988) take it for granted that neither (20) nor (21)










9where ￿ = u0
1 (ct
1) is the Lagrange multiplier of (19), for every t ￿ 0.
The market equilibrium is e¢ cient in the Baland-Robinson sense. Even
assuming (see section 2) that ￿ is equal to the common value of ￿, so that
W t coincides with Ut, however, the allocation is not socially optimal.
Comparing (22) with (11), it is in fact clear that atomistic parents do not
take account of the contribution to aggregate production, represented by
the second left-hand-side term of (11), that an extra child would make
at date t + 1. There is thus a positive population externality. Fertility
(hence, population size at each t > 0) is too low for each t ￿ 0.
If either (20) or (21) is binding for any t, the allocation is not even
e¢ cient in the Baland-Robinson sense. The former is intuited in Becker
and Murphy (1988), where it is pointed out that "operative bequests" are
necessary for an e¢ cient allocation of consumption.6 What those authors
had in mind, however, is the standard Pareto criterion, which cannot be
applied in an endogenous fertility context. Baland and Robinson (2002)
show that, if either of the said constraints is binding, fertility will be
ine¢ ciently high, and youthful consumption ine¢ ciently low.
Suppose that children (i) are born in (rapid) sequence, and (ii) once
born, are treated the same. This allows us to, so to speak, step in the
middle of a person￿ s reproductive career, and enquire whether the chil-
dren born until then could successfully bribe their parent not to have any
more. That is obviously not possible if the allocation is e¢ cient. But,
suppose that the nonnegative-transfer constraint is binding. Instead of
































where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier of (20). As the children value their
current consumption, at the margin, more than the parent values hers,
there is then scope for mutually bene￿cial exchange. The problem is
that the exchange will not go through, because young children cannot
credibly commit to reimburse their parent when they become adults.
A similar argument applies if the borrowing constraint (21) is bind-





























where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier of (21). In this case, the parent and
the children place the same marginal value on current consumption, but
6The terminology re￿ ects the assumption in the Becker-Barro model that elderly
parents do not make inter-vivos transfers to adult children. If they make any trans-
fers, therefore, it will be in the form of bequest.
10this common value is greater than the interest factor. Rather than insuf-
￿cient commitment, the problem is now that neither party can borrow
as much as would be required for an e¢ cient allocation of resources.
4 The family
In the real world, individuals interact not only through the market, but
also through lower-level organizations such as families, clubs, and inter-
est groups. In particular, decisions regarding fertility and the intergen-
erational allocation of resources tend to be coordinated by families. In
game-theoretical language, any such organization is a coalition, a sub-
set of the population whose members are better o⁄ re-distributing their
endowments among themselves, rather than going to the market.
Intendedly, Becker and Barro (1988) is about the family, but the
model is rigged-up in such a way, that no member of the family has
any reason to dissent from the parent￿ s decisions. As already pointed
out, the family thus operates as if it consisted of just one in￿nite-lived
individual. The same may be said of much of Gary Becker￿ s contributions
to the subject, epitomized by his ￿ rotten kid theorem￿(Becker, 1974).
In essence, there is always a member of the family who, by virtue of
(a) having the well-being of other members at heart, and (b) controlling
a su¢ ciently large part of family resources to be in a position to make
gifts (bequests in the model with Barro), can e⁄ectively decide how much
each member will consume, subject only to the constraints imposed by
the market.
An early attempt at giving the family a distinctive role, additional
and in some sense alternative to that of the market, is Neher (1971).
Elaborating on an idea of Leibenstein (1960), that the demand for chil-
dren may be derived from that for old-age support (the so-called ￿ old-age
security motive￿ ), Philip Neher imagines a situation were property rights
are vested in families, rather than individuals, and family income is dis-
tributed according to a ￿ ... share alike ethic whereby all members of the
family have equal claim to the product whether they work or not.￿Thus
conceived, a family creates opportunities (of free-riding!), and places re-
strictions on individual behaviour, that would not be there if individuals
interacted only through the market. In such a situation, fertility turns
out to be higher than it would be if adults could individually accumulate
assets, and higher also than the social optimum. The rules governing
Neher￿ s family are arbitrarily given. We now look in somewhat greater
detail at a model where the rules are endogenously determined.
A useful way of characterizing an organization is to describe its fun-
damental rules, its constitution. Economic theory tells us that it may
be in the interest of every member of a community to agree ￿rst on a
11constitution, allowing them to safely renounce the dominant strategy in
a prisoner￿ s dilemma type of situation, and then optimize individually
subject to that constitution (Buchanan, 1987). Although originally con-
ceived with reference to city or nation states, the constitution concept
can be applied also to smaller groupings, such as families. Cigno (1993)
puts forward the idea of a ￿ family constitution￿ , and establishes condi-
tions under which this is self-enforcing in the sense that it is in the best
interest of every family member to obey it, and have it obeyed. Cigno
(2006) identi￿es circumstances in which a constitution is self-enforcing
also in the stronger sense that, once established, it is renegotiation-proof.
Statistical testing does not appear to reject the hypothesis that behav-
iour is constrained by such constitutions.7 This approach provides an
analytical basis for Leibenstein￿ s original intuition that sel￿sh adults
have children in order to secure old-age support.
4.1 Self-enforcing family constitutions
Suppose that people are self-interested, so that the lifetime utility of each
person is given by (1). If a cooperative agreement will stick under such
unpromising conditions, all the more it will if people love their parent and
children. At any given date, a family consists of individuals at di⁄erent
points of the life-cycle. Age di⁄erences are important, because they
provide an opportunity for mutually bene￿cial deals between members
of the same family. Let a family constitution be de￿ned as a set of
(unwritten, typically unspoken) rules prescribing, for each date t, the
minimum amount of income, zt, that each adult must transfer to each
of her children (if she has any), and the minimum amount of income,
xt, that she must transfer to her parent, subject to the pro viso that
nothing is due to a parent who did not herself obey the rules. The last
clause makes it in every adult￿ s interest to punish transgressors. That
is important, because only an adult can punish another adult. Neither
children nor old people have the means to do so.
It is sometimes claimed, especially in the household and development
economics literatures, that mutually bene￿cial transactions not possible
at the market level may come-o⁄at the family or local community level.
The argument is that proximity helps overcome the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems associated with anonymous exchange. The
possible objection, that informal transactions between relatives or neigh-
bours cannot be enforced in a court of law, is typically brushed aside
by implicitly or explicitly assuming that tightly-knit communities have
extra-legal means, like ostracism (or downright illegal ones, like physical
force), of deterring defection. No such assumption is required to justify
7See Cigno, Giannelli, Rosati and Vuri (2004).
12the family constitution story. The clause that makes it in the interest
of every adult family member to punish a disobedient parent turns an
informational advantage (a person presumably knows the history of her
own family) into an enforcement advantage.
The existence of a family constitution faces each adult with a choice
of two strategies: comply with the constitution (cooperate), or go it alone
in the market (defect). Since children cost their parents something (at
least p), but will only bring a return if the constitution is complied with,
it is clear that a go-it-aloner will not have children. It is also clear
that a complier will not transfer her parent and children more than the
minimum required by the constitution. For reasons that will become
clear in a moment, compliers have no interest in lending to the capital
market (and are not allowed to borrow from the market against their
constitutional entitlements).
Suppose that the interest rate, hence the stock of capital and the
wage rate, are constant over time, xt = x and zt = z for all t. That is
a convenient simpli￿cation, but there is no conceptual di¢ culty in deal-
ing with changing environments, hence with family constitutions that
prescribe generation-speci￿c (and, if the state of the world is uncertain,
state-conditional) payments. Dispensing with time superscripts, and us-
ing s to denote the amount lent to the market in period 1, the pay-o⁄
to going it alone is then
v(r;w) = max
s u1 (w ￿ s) + u2 (rs): (25)
For any given (r;w), the choice of s satis￿es
u0




The e⁄ects of changes in r or w on the pay-o⁄ of this strategy are
vw = u
0
1 (w ￿ s); vr = su
0
2 (rs): (27)




n u1 (w ￿ x ￿ (p + z)n) + u2 (xn): (28)
For any given (x;w;z), the choice of n satis￿es
u0
























1 (w ￿ x ￿ (p + z)n): (32)
If
v
￿(w;x;z) ￿ v(r;w); (33)
complying is the best response to everyone else doing the same. The
set of ￿ comply￿strategies (one for each member of each generation of
the same family) is thus a Nash equilibrium. Since complying implies
threatening one￿ s own parent of punishment if she does not comply too,
and the threat is credible because carrying it out is in the interest of
the person making it, the equilibrium is sub-game perfect. In equilib-
rium, the threat is never carried out because every member of the family
complies.
For a complier, having a child is a form of investment, costing p + z
in the current period, and yielding, in equilibrium, x in the next. The
marginal return on this investment is thus x=(p + z). In order to qualify
for this return, however, the complier must pay a ￿xed amount x to
her parent. A necessary condition for (33) to be true is then that the
marginal return to investing in children is strictly larger than the return




Were that not so, there is in fact no way that an agent could recover
the ￿xed cost of complying. Given (34), a complier will not save. We
can then think of the amount x that a complier pays to her parent as an
entrance fee, entitling members to earn a marginal return higher than r.
While making it disadvantageous for compliers to lend to the mar-
ket, (34) makes it advantageous for them to borrow from the market
in order to ￿nance additional births. But there are limits to this arbi-
trage operation. First, fertility cannot increase without bound because
it will eventually hit its physiological ceiling. Second, there is no legal
mechanism through which entitlements arising from an informal family
arrangement can be transferred to a third party. Since an entitlement
that cannot be legally transferred to a third party cannot be used as
collateral to obtain credit from the market, we assume that compliers
cannot borrow from the market at all (but nothing of substance changes
if we allow them to borrow up to some positive amount, smaller than
nz).
14The set of the (z;x) pairs that make (33) into an equation is bounded


















Therefore, the marginal return to children implied by the constitution
(z￿;x￿) is equal to the number of children that a a complier would choose
given that constitution.
Given that vr is positive in view of (27), a rise in r will shift the
boundary inwards. Intuitively, that is because the lowest rate of return
to children that makes complying with the constitution at least as at-
tractive as going it alone in the market increases with the market rate
of interest. By contrast, a rise in w shifts the boundary outwards. Al-
though vw and v￿
w are both positive in view of (27) and (31), the latter is
in fact larger than the former. The reason is simply that, in view of (34),
compliers have lower current consumption, and consequently higher mar-
ginal utility of the same, than go-it-aloners. While an exogenous rise in
the interest rate would make the set of sustainable constitutions smaller,
an exogenous rise in the wage rate would thus make it larger. For w=r
su¢ ciently low, the set will be empty. An interesting implication of these
results is that a rise in the interest rate would result in lower aggregate
fertility. Neher, mentioned earlier, reached the same conclusion by a
di⁄erent route.
4.2 Picking a constitution
Given that an in￿nite number of (z;x) pairs may satisfy (33), and that
an in￿nite number of constitutions might thus be sustained by a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium, which will prevail? Cigno (2006) o⁄ers
a selection criterion akin to the renegotiation-proofness concept of Bern-
heim and Ray (1989), and Maskin and Farrell (1989). At any date t,
any adult member of any existing family is at liberty to propose a new
constitution (in other words, to found a new family). Will her children
take any notice? Not if (i) the old constitution satis￿es (33), and (ii)
no other constitution satisfying (33) makes generations t, t + 1, t + 2,
... better-o⁄. In other words, a constitution is renegotiation-proof if, in
15addition to being a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, it is not Pareto-
dominated by any other constitution which is itself a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium.
If the existing constitution is undominated, the only way a person
can o⁄er her children a better deal, and not loose in the bargain, is
by paying her parent less than the existing constitution requires ￿in
other words, by defaulting on the existing constitution. But that would
make her liable to punishment at the hands of her own children. The
latter would in fact be better-o⁄ abiding by the existing constitution,
which entitles them to pay nothing to their parent, than acquiescing to
the proposed new one. Once established, a constitution satisfying the
double requirement of being a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, and
undominated by any other constitution which is itself a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium, is thus renegotiation-proof.
Let us characterize such a constitution. At any given date, the adults
of the day are only interested in adult and old-age consumption, but their
children are interested also in youthful consumption. A family constitu-
tion is then renegotiation-proof if it maximizes the lifetime utility of the
representative individual (generation),
U (x;z;w) = u0 (z) + u1 (w ￿ x ￿ (p + z)n) + u2 (xn); (38)
subject to (33).





1 (w ￿ x ￿ (p + z)n)
= n =
u0




and (37). It thus equalizes the parent and the children￿ s marginal rate
of substitution of present for future consumption. In this case, the point
representing the renegotiation-proof constitution could be located any-
where inside the Nash frontier.




1 (w ￿ x ￿ (p + z)n)
= (1 + ￿)n; (40)
where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of (33),
u0




and (37). At the margin, the children then value their current consump-
tion more than the parent values hers. In this case, the renegotiation-
proof constitution is represented by a point on the Nash frontier. Since
16the only point of the frontier satisfying (37) is (x￿;z￿), the renegotiation-
proof constitution is the one that maximizes transfers to the young.
Since the return to money spent on children is greater than the return
to saving in view of (34), the allocation brought about by a renegotiation-
proof constitution cannot be a social optimum. Even in the case where
(33) is not binding, and the marginal rates of substitution are thus equal-
ized, the common value of these marginal rates is in fact higher than the
interest factor. Therefore, (6) is not satis￿ed. In the case where (33) is
binding, the children￿ s marginal rate of substitution of present for future
consumption is larger than the parent￿ s. The allocation is thus ine¢ cient
in the Baland-Robinson sense (see, again, Figure 1), but nonetheless pre-
ferred by the adults of the day to anything the market could achieve.
5 The state
We have seen that a laissez-faire equilibrium need not be a social opti-
mum, and may not even be e¢ cient. Can the state succeed where the
market and the family fail? In this section, we look for ways in which
the shortcomings of laissez-faire equilibria can be remedied by deliber-
ate policy. The problem of political acceptability will be examined in
the next section. Assuming that all individuals are the same, that r
(hence, w) is constant, that individual behaviour is observable, and that
the market is the only spontaneous coordination mechanism available,
Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) show that a Millian social optimum
can be implemented by introducing, side by side, a pay-as-you-go pen-
sion scheme and a system of child bene￿ts, each ￿nanced by a lump-sum
tax on adults. Analogous results are obtained by Peters (1995), and Kol-
mar (1997). Groezen et al. assume that people derive utility not only
from their own consumption, but also from the number of children. The
argument, however, has more general validity. We adapt their analysis
to the case where people derive utility from consumption only.
Let ￿ be a lump-sum bene￿t payable to each old person, and ￿ a lump-
sum contribution payable by each adult. Assuming that the scheme must
break even,
￿ = ￿n; (42)
the policy imposes a life-cycle reallocation, but not an intergenerational
transfer. Similarly, let ’ be the bene￿t payable to adults for each child
they have, and ￿ a lump-sum tax, payable by each adult. Assuming that
it, too, must break even,
’n = ￿; (43)
this scheme does not impose an intergenerational transfer, but does re-
distribute in favour of adults with children.
17Let an asterisk denote the socially optimal value of a variable. The





’ = p + c￿
0, and o⁄ering each adult j the following ￿ forcing contract￿ :8
￿j = (p + c￿




￿j = ￿0 > (p + c￿
0)n￿ otherwise
: (44)
The agent has then two alternatives: either procure n￿ births, spend
p+c￿
0 for each child that is born, and save nothing; or have no children,
and save some positive amount, sj. Given (1), the pay-o⁄ to the ￿rst
course of action is
u1 (w ￿ ￿) + u2 (￿): (45)












By setting ￿0 su¢ ciently large,9 the government can induce j to
choose the ￿rst alternative. Then, nj = n￿, and c
j
i = c￿
i (i = 0;1;2)
for every j. The policy looks remarkably like a family constitution, but
with an important di⁄erence. Since the government, unlike the family,
has the power to coerce, the former does not need to distort individual
incentives to get people to comply. Combined with lack of uncertainty
and informational asymmetries, that is what permits the government to
achieve a ￿rst best.
Groezen et al. (2003) make the point that, without a child bene￿t
scheme by its side, a pay-as-you-go pension scheme would create a pos-
itive population externality, because atomistic agents do not take into
account that an extra birth increases social welfare by relaxing (42).
We might then be tempted to regard ’ as a Pigovian subsidy, but that
would not be right. The policy maker does not in fact pay child ben-
e￿ts to induce agents to choose the right level of fertility,because that
is costlessly achieved by threaten them with a su¢ ciently high penalty
if they do otherwise. This unpleasant implication of ￿rst-best policy is
an unavoidable implication of the fact that the number of children is
8The expression comes from the principal-agent literature, and applies to any
situation where the agent￿ s actions are observable by the principal. Applied to the
number of childen, it has an unpleasant authoritarian ring about it, but this is purely
a consequence of the simplifying assumption that parents have perfect control over
the number of births, and that the action of procuring a certain number of children
thus coincides with its visible outcome.
9Alternatively, the government could threaten the agent with a drastically reduced
pension. The important point to be noted is that it costs the government nothing to
enforce the socially optimal plan.
18observable, and of the assumption that parents can produce children by
￿at. It will only go away when we allow for a random factor in realized
fertility (see Section 7). Under present assumptions, child bene￿ts serve
only to refund agents of the optimal cost of raising the optimal number
of children, and thus to allow the parents themselves to buy the socially
optimal level of consumption.
In real life agents are di⁄erentiated by a number of personal char-
acteristics (earning capacity, cost of raising children, etc.). For a ￿rst
best, public transfers would then need to be personalized. If some of
these characteristics are private information, a ￿rst best is out of the
question. Provided the government has statistical information on the
frequency distribution of these characteristics, it can induce agents to
reveal their characteristics by o⁄ering them a menu of ￿scal treatments,
one for each type of agent. This approach, originally devised by James
Mirrlees and further developed by Joseph Stiglitz, involves distorting the
decisions of the type more benignly treated by the ￿sc in order to deter
mimicking. Since the number of children is a choice variable, however,
the mimicker must procure the same number of children as the mim-
icked.10 Mimicking is thus more di¢ cult, and the distortion required to
deter it smaller, than it would be if fertility were exogenous.
Let us now bring family constitutions back into the picture. If the
market provided perfect substitutes for attention, it is clear that these
domestic arrangements would be wiped out by the policy we have just
described. The same would be true if attention did not have perfect
market substitutes, but could be costlessly monitored by the public au-
thorities, because the amount of attention due from each agent would
then be speci￿ed in the forcing contract. But that would be stretching
credibility too far. If we realistically assume that no public authority
can enforce attention at zero cost, a ￿rst best is out of reach, and family
constitutions securing the delivery of attention to both the young and
the old may then survive in the folds of second-best policy.
6 Political acceptability
We now address the question whether a system of public transfers can
be implemented in a democratic society. Browning (1975) makes the
fundamental point that, since children do not vote, direct democracy
produces a pension system that is larger than the one which would max-
imize the lifetime utility of the representative agent. This argument
is further developed in a long series of public choice papers, including
Boadway and Wildasin (1989), Hansson and Stuart (1989), Tabellini
10See Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini (2002).
19(1991), Verbon (1993), Peters (1995), Meijdam and Verbon (1996), Kol-
mar (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1998), and Boldrin and Rustichini
(2000), among others. See Breyer (1994) for an early survey.
A somewhat smaller number of contributions, beginning with Shu-
bick (1981) and including, among others, Kotliko⁄, Persson and Svens-
son (1986), Kotliko⁄(1988), Esteban and Sakovics (1993), and Caillaud
and Cohen (2000), attempt to explain public intergenerational trans-
fers as the outcome of some kind of constitutional arrangement. These
constitutional political economy papers pose, at the level of society, the
same sort of questions that the papers examined in Section 4 pose at
the level of the family. Although the idea of a constitution comes from
politics, the kind of unspoken agreement these authors are looking for is
in fact closer in spirit to a family constitution, than to a political con-
stitution in the usual sense. To avoid confusion, we shall thus refer to
such an arrangement as a ￿ social compact￿ , rather than a constitution.
The contributions to this sub-literature share a number of common
assumptions. The ￿rst is that fertility is exogenous. The second is that
(with rare exceptions such as Hansson and Stuart, who postulate altru-
ism towards the old) agents are self-interested. The third is that, with
the notable exception of Shubick￿ s pioneering work, people are either
born adult, or do not eat when young. Transfers to the young come into
the picture only insofar as they serve to pay for education, and inasmuch
as education raises future productivity.
The last assumption is di¢ cult to justify. Even assuming (unrealisti-
cally) that they do not require material or personal assistance from their
own or anyone else￿ s children, the old still need adults around to trans-
form any capital stock they may have accumulated into consumption
goods. Therefore, current adults may be expected to have a keen inter-
est in the survival, hence in the current consumption, of future adults.
Future productivity should be only a second-order consideration. Why
are the young ignored then? As Martin Shubick noted with reference
to Samuelson (1958), there is an implicit assumption that parents will
instinctively provide for the survival of their o⁄spring. Either that, one
might add, or political agreement on legislation obliging parents to care
for their children is reached as a matter of course. But neither of these
assumptions is su¢ cient to ensure that the young will receive the e¢ cient
level of support.
6.1 A social compact?
We now look for the possibility that intergenerational cooperation might
be the result of some kind of constitution-like social agreement. Esteban
and Sakovics (1993) examine a number of stylized institutions that redis-
20tribute intergenerationally, and explain their emergence as the outcome
of some kind of either cooperative or non cooperative game between
generations. Rather than looking for a self-enforcing mechanism, these
authors rely on the build-up of trust to make the agreement stick. By
contrast, Caillaud and Cohen (2000) search for the society-wide equiva-
lent of a self-enforcing family constitution.
The framework is highly simpli￿ed. Adults produce but do not con-
sume, and the old consume but do not produce, a perishable consump-





where lt is the labour supplied by an adult at date t, and kt is now
interpreted as the state of knowledge (but could just as well be the stock
of capital) at that same date. The time-path of k is exogenous (but
nothing of substance changes if it is endogenized). Population is also
exogenous, and taken to be constant. The lifetime utility of a member










where ￿ (kt;:) is a convex loss function, measuring the disutility (given
the current state of knowledge, kt) of supplying lt units of labour in
period 1 for a member of generation t.
A Pareto-optimal lt maximizes (48), subject to (47). The market
alone will not yield such an outcome. Since people care only about their
own consumption, generation t will in fact produce goods only if this
induces generation t+1 to do the same. In the absence of a mechanism
ensuring that, nobody produces anything; consequently, nobody grows
to be old. We are back to Samuelson (1958).
The way out proposed by Caillaud and Cohen is analogous to Cigno
(1993, 2006), examined in section 4. They look for a ￿ standard of behav-
iour￿thus conceived, that any ￿ generation should not be in a position
such that it would prefer to erase the past, name itself generation [0]
and reinitialize the strategy pro￿le that was followed up to this date,
rather than continue to abide by the current strategy pro￿le￿(Caillaud
and Cohen, 2000). As in subsection 4:2, an undominated allocation of
consumption meets this criterion, and is thus renegotiation-proof. Alter-
native approaches, such as the one proposed by Kotliko⁄ et al. (1986),
who view the constitution as an asset that the old would like to sell to
the adult generation, do not pin down a unique standard of behaviour.
A problem with this transposition of the constitution idea from the
family level to society at large is that a single defector cannot be pun-
ished without also punishing the whole generation to which the defector
21belongs. While a family constitution entitles an adult to punish her own
parent (not the entire category) if the latter misbehaved, the standard of
behaviour proposed by Caillaud and Cohen does in fact entitle a gener-
ation to collectively punish all members of the previous generation (e.g.,
by stopping pension payments) if just one of them misbehaved. That
makes the threat less than credible. Furthermore, for the argument to
go through, it is required that each adult know not only how her own
parent, but also how every other member of her parent￿ s generation be-
haved. This imposes an unrealistically heavy informational requirement
on the scheme.
These problems go away if adults are altruistically inclined towards
the old, as assumed in an earlier contribution by Veall (1986). Altruism,
however, is a stronger assumption to make at the level of whole society,
than in a family context. If we think of altruistic behaviour as a product
of acquaintance, and society is not just the population of a little village,
a lifetime will not be enough for anyone to get to know and love every
other member of society.
6.2 Direct democracy
Browning￿ s seminal contribution assumes direct democracy. Taken liter-
ally, this means that citizens are able to vote on every single policy. That
is unusual in real life, but some political constitutions do contemplate
referenda on a range of speci￿ed issues. Others allow only consultative
referenda, but the outcome of these consultations heavily conditions the
decisions of parliament. Direct democracy gives current voters the power
to condition future voting because it creates vested interests. Suppose,
for example, that a pay-as-you-go pension system is voted in at date
t: At date t + 1, part of the electorate (the old of the day) will have
a vested interest in keeping the system going. The same may be said
about a vote, at date t+1, on whether to honour the public debt issued
on the strength of a vote at date t.
We now examine a number of contributions that exploit the dynamic
interdependence of single-issue political consultations under the assump-
tion of rational expectations. As these papers look for conditions such
that a decision is not overturned (at least not immediately) by a sub-
sequent vote, the research agenda is not very di⁄erent from that of the
￿ constitutional￿ models examined in the last subsection. The crucial
di⁄erence is that the generation or generations who introduce the policy
have now a ￿rst-mover advantage on subsequent generations. Constitu-
tions are designed to prevent exactly that!
An equilibrium is de￿ned as a sequence of policy decisions and market
prices such that, at each date, (i) markets clear, (ii) the utility of each
22agent is at a maximum given the policy and the prices, and (iii) the policy
is weakly preferred to any other by a majority of current voters. The last
restriction plays a role analogous to that of renegotiation-proofness in a
constitutional model. The rational expectations assumption bites more
deeply here than in an ordinary market equilibrium model, because it
implies an understanding on the part of all voters not only of the general
equilibrium e⁄ects of the policy they are called to vote upon, but also
of the way in which the policy will condition future voting behaviour.
6.2.1 Voting over pensions
Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) are interested in the possibility that a
pay-as-you-go pension system brought in by referendum at a certain
date will never be revoked, or will at least survive the generations that
voted it in. The set-up is similar to that of section 3, except that fertility
is now exogenous, and the economy is assumed to be closed. The latter
is essential, because the argument now rests crucially on the general-
equilibrium e⁄ects that the policy is expected to have on factor prices.
At each date t, adult and old citizens are called to vote on a policy that
taxes each adult ￿
t = ￿twt (0 ￿ ￿t < 1), and pays each old person
￿t￿1 = nt￿1￿
t.11 The vote is essentially about the value of ￿t (￿t = 0
means that the policy is rejected). Clearly, the old will favour as large
a ￿t as possible. Adults may face a trade-o⁄. On the one hand, any ￿t
greater than zero reduces their current consumption; on the other, the
policy could o⁄er a higher return than the market (
￿t
￿t > rt).
Given kt and ￿t, and the expectations held by current adults about
￿t (the actual one will depend on nt and ￿t+1), market competition
determines factor prices, and the amount saved by each adult, at date
t. A vote at date t in favour of introducing, or maintaining, a pay-as-
you-go pension system would in￿ uence the amount collectively saved by
generation t, hence the capital stock, and factor prices, at date t + 1.
Therefore, the outcome of the vote taken at t creates facts on the ground,
that will condition future voting behaviour. Under particular functional
assumptions (not dissimilar from those of Caillaud and Cohen, examined
in the last subsection), Boldrin and Rustichini establish conditions on
technology and individual preferences, such that a sequence of tax rates
(￿0, ￿1, ￿2, ...) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Boldrin and Rustichini ￿nd that there may be equilibria where the
pension system is not brought in until a certain date, but it is then kept
forever. The opposite case, where the system is abandoned after a certain
date, is not admissible in a growing economy. If n is always greater than
11Recall that nt￿1 is the fertility rate of generation t ￿ 1, an thus the ratio of tax
payers to pensioners at date t.
231, there are always more adult than old voters. Were it known in advance
that generation t would vote against the system at date t, generation t￿1
would vote against it at t￿1, otherwise it would ￿nd itself ￿nancing the
pensions of generation t ￿ 2 for no good reason. Since the same applies
to generations t￿2, t￿3, ..., a pay-as-you-go pension system can exist
only if everyone believes that it will go on forever.12 Suppose, however,
that a sudden drop in the population growth rate will some day make
the pay-as-you-go pension system unsustainable as a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium. If the agents know that this will happen, but are not
sure when, they may take the risk of voting for the maintenance of the
pay-as-you-go system one period more. Boldrin and Rustichini show this
to be the case under certain functional assumptions.
It is interesting to compare this way of dealing with the issue with
that of Caillaud and Cohen, examined in the last subsection. There,
many alternative standards of behaviour could be sustained as sub-game
perfect Nash equilibria, but only one was renegotiation-proof. Here, if
an economic-political equilibrium exists, it may be unique (in the ex-
amples provided by Boldrin and Rustichini, there is only one stable
equilibrium). In contrast with a renegotiation-proof standard of behav-
iour, however, the economic-political equilibrium brought about by a
sequence of plebiscites need not be e¢ cient.
6.2.2 Voting over the public debt
At various stages of this survey, we have come across the result that al-
lowing for either altruism or intra-generational heterogeneity facilitates
intergenerational cooperation. Tabellini (1991) assumes both intragen-
erational heterogeneity, and (bilateral) altruism, but the result is an
increase in the ￿rst-mover advantage of earlier generations. It would
thus appear that, in the absence of a constitution at some level, altru-
ism or intragenerational heterogeneity bring about exploitation of future
generations, rather than mutually bene￿cial cooperation.
The policy under consideration is now government debt, rather than
a pay-as-you-go pension system as in Boldrin and Rustichini, just ex-
amined. The latter also implies a public debt, because it commits a
generation to make a net transfer to the previous one; it, too, can be
repudiated just like and explicit debt. But the creditors of a pension
system are the old of the land, not just those of them who chose to buy
government bonds. Tabellini looks for conditions such that the public
debt issued at a certain date will not be repudiated at the next. The
amount of debt to be issued, and the subsequent decision whether or not
12The same is true of the family constitution examined in sections 4, and of the
standard of behaviour discussed earlier in this section.
24to honour it, are the subject of referendum. As usual, only adults and
the old can vote.
At date 0, there is a certain number of adults, each of whom begets an
exogenously given number of children, n. At date 1, those children will
be adults, and their parents will be old. In order to end the story there,
it is assumed that generation 1 does not have children, and will not live
to be old. It is further assumed that parents are altruistic towards their
children, and children towards their parents, but things are so arranged
that, in equilibrium, nobody makes gifts yo anybody. Intragenerational
heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that, in periods 1 and 2 of her
life, each agent j receives a
j
i (i = 1;2) units of a perishable good. The
cumulative distribution of this endowment is common knowledge, but
the actual aj is known only to j. In other words, individual wealth is
not observable. Each member of generation t (t = 0;1) produces wt
units of the good in period 1 of her life. Unlike initial endowments, wt is
the same for all j (but may vary endogenously with t). This assumption
is intended to capture the empirical regularity that income is generally
less unequally distributed than wealth.
Let us now describe the political process. At date 0, the government
submits to referendum a policy proposal that would pay every current
adult a lump sum g ￿ 0, and ￿nance these transfers by issuing bonds.
The vote is about the value of g (g = 0 means that no debt is issued, and
no public transfer is consequently made). Since there are no old people
yet, only adults vote. Once the vote is taken, each adult decides how
much to save; adult j saves sj. assuming that there is no store of value
other public debt, saving means buying government bonds. Notice that,
as adults have di⁄erent wealth endowments, they may save di⁄erent
amounts.
At date 1, the electorate is called upon to decide whether to honour or
repudiate the debt. If it is decided that the debt should be honoured, the
government will have to recover the cost by taxing current incomes and
bond holdings. Since inherited wealth is not observable, bond holdings
can be taxed only at a ￿ at rate, denoted by ￿. Since w is the same
for all adults, the income tax rate, ￿, is also the same for everybody.
If it is decided that the debt should be repudiated, there is no need to
raise taxes, but bonds become worthless (￿ = 1, ￿ = 0). The vote is
about the values of ￿ and ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1). Whichever policy
emerges from the polls, it will redistribute not only between, but also
within generations.
On the assumption that n > 1, at date 1, there are more adult than
old voters. Therefore, the old alone could not push through a resolution
in favour of honouring the debt. Furthermore, it is not in the interest
25of all the old that the debt should be honoured, because some of them
do not hold bonds, but all have children. If the debt is honoured, any
bonds held by the former will in fact have a positive redemption value,
but the latter will have to pay tax on their incomes. Therefore, families
without savings are unambiguously in favour of repudiating the debt
(i.e., of expropriating the rich), but families with savings face a trade-
o⁄. Assuming single-peaked preferences, the outcome of the vote is
determined by the ￿ median voter￿who, in the present context, is a kind
of synthetic family, consisting of an old person m, holding a share
sm
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is so determined that, in the economic-political
equilibrium, the two members of this synthetic family vote in exactly
the same way.
Under certain functional and other restrictions, Tabellini shows that
a majority comprised of both adult and old voters may favour honouring












where adult consumption, c1
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where r is the net redemption value of a government bond (r ￿ 1 is the
implicit rate of return on a bond after paying the tax ￿).
If the politically viable set is non-empty, generation 0 will vote,
at date 0; in favour of a public transfer to themselves, con￿dent in
the knowledge that the resulting debt will fall partly on generation 1.
Clearly, these voters will favour the largest sustainable debt, g00. Such a
policy would not have been passed if generation 1 could have voted at
date 0. In the absence of a constitution preventing generation 0 from
exploiting their ￿rst-mover advantage, however, generation 0 will vote
to change the economic environment in such a way, that it is then in the
interest of a su¢ cient number of members of generation 1 to vote, at the
next referendum, in favour of honouring the debt. This underlines the
di⁄erence between a sequential voting model, such as this, or the one of
the last sub-subsection, and a ￿ constitutional￿model where the ground
rules are laid down before anyone has a chance to change things to her
advantage.
26In contrast with the model of the last sub-subsection, a pay-as-you-
go pension system is not politically viable in the present context. Since
generation 1 does not have children, and knows that it will not live to
be old, its members would in fact oppose being taxed to give generation
0 a pension (being altruistic towards their parents, however, the may
give them gifts); but this result is contrived. If generation 1 did not
die prematurely, and were followed by a generation 2, a generation 3,
etc., a pay-as-you-go pension system might be sustainable. It is more
interesting to note that, in the Tabellini model, generation 0 can change
the landscape for generation 1 not only via factor price changes as in
Boldrin and Rustichini, but also via changes in the personal distribution
of wealth. That is possible because Tabellini allows for the initial dis-
tribution of wealth to be unequal, and assumes bilateral altruism. The
￿rst assumption uncouples the fate of individual agents from that of the
rest of their generation, the second ties it to that of their ascendants and
descendents. Without these two assumptions, debt-￿nancing would not
be politically viable in this model either.
6.3 Representative democracy
We have already noted that, in real life, ￿ government by the people￿
usually means representative democracy. In such a system, policies are
decided upon by the government, or by the parliamentary majority that
supports it. Since governments are voted-in on the basis of broad, often
vaguely worded, electoral programmes, that gives the executive a certain
latitude over which measures actually to implement. It also leaves it
open to pressure by interest groups (which, in our context, re￿ ect age
groups). While direct democracy models predict the behaviour of voters,
representative democracy models thus predict essentially the behaviour
of politicians.
There are two ways, respectively inspired by Becker (1983) and Cough-
lin (1986), of modelling the political process in a representative democ-
racy. Becker makes the relative political weight of each interest group
a function of its relative expenditure on lobbying. Coughlin shows that
maximizing the probability of re-election in a two-party system tanta-
mounts to maximizing the sum of the objective functions of the voters.
The public choice literature on intergenerational transfers draws on both
these considerations by expressing the government￿ s objective (some au-
thors call it ￿ target￿ , others ￿ political support￿ ) function, at any date t,
as a weighted sum of the utilities of generations t and t￿1. This di⁄ers
with a conventional social welfare function in that the relative weight of
each generation depends on its ability to exert political in￿ uence, rather
than on ethical considerations. As only electors count, the young have
27zero political weight. Their consumption or utility would enter the ob-
jective function of the government if it were an argument in the utility
function of their respective parents, but it is assumed that it is not.
With the exception of Hansson and Stuart (1989), who implicitly
assume the existence of a constitution by imposing that each generation
has the right to block any new legislation that would leave it worse-o⁄,
the assumption commonly made in representative democracy models is
that any decision taken by a parliament can be reversed by the next.
Again with the exception of Hansson and Stuart, who postulate ascend-
ing altruism, another common assumption is that individuals, and the
governments they elect, are self-interested. In the models we shall ex-
amine in some detail, adult individuals maximize the utility they get
from their own consumption over what is left of their life cycle. The
government maximizes the probability of its own re-election. At any
given date, adults decide how much to save, taking current and future
taxes and bene￿ts as given.
As in the last subsection, the economic-political equilibrium is mod-
elled as a sequence of non-cooperative games. At each date, the govern-
ment chooses current taxes and bene￿ts, taking current saving decisions,
and future taxes and bene￿ts as given (in comparison with the direct
democracy models, the sequence of economic and political decisions is
thus reversed). Since future taxes and bene￿ts will be decided by the
future governments, the current Nash equilibrium is conditioned by po-
litical expectations. Boadway and Wildasin (1989) assume arbitrary ex-
pectations about future political decisions; the papers examined below
impose rational ones.
6.3.1 Lobbying for pensions
Meijdam and Verbon (1996) postulate a closed economy, such that the
interest rate is endogenous. Their motivation for making this assumption
is to rule out corner solutions with either zero private saving, or zero
public pensions. At any date t, adults choose (ct
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taking the current pension contribution, ￿
t, and the future pension bene-
￿t, ￿t+1, as given. As usual, the ￿rst-order condition yields (??). Having
conveniently assumed that the young live on air, this ensures that con-
sumption is e¢ ciently allocated over the life-cycle of each generation.
The old have no allocative decision to take. Given the current pension








Since kt is pre-determined by st￿1, the private sector of the economy is
closed using (2), (5) and (16).
Taking st and ￿t+1 as given, today￿ s government chooses ￿
t and ￿t so
























where ￿t denotes the relative political weight of the old, subject to (51)-





Political weight could simply re￿ ect numerical strength, in which case
￿t = 1 for all t. More generally, however, it may re￿ ect ability to coor-
dinate, and thus to exert political in￿ uence by lobbying.
As the authors themselves point out, the larger a group, the more
costly it is for its members to coordinate their lobbying activities. From
the argument that political weight may di⁄er from numerical strength
as a result of lobbying, it then follows that the political weight of the
old could increase with the relative numerical strength of adults. Casual
observation does indeed suggest that an increase in the dependency ratio
(the number of old people per adult) raises public concern for the welfare
of the working generations, not of the retired. Nonetheless, Meijdam and
Verbon assume that the relative political weight of the old increases with
their numbers, ￿t = ￿(nt￿1), ￿0 (:) < 0.












If a Nash equilibrium exists, the value of ￿
t that solves (56) maximizes
the government￿ s chances of re-election. Therefore, a sequence of voting
equilibria may support transfers to the old. Will it allocate consumption
e¢ ciently?13 In general it will not, because there is nothing to ensure
that public transfers satisfy (6). In view of (??), however, (56) implies
rt = ￿(nt￿1) for all t. If the exogenously given rate of population growth
13Such a question is not in the public choice spirit. Indeed, it is not addressed
in Meijdam and Verbon (1996); we have a stab at it exploiting the analogies with
Meijdam and Verbon (1997).
29is constant over time (nt = n for all t), the political process then yields
a steady state characterized by
r = ￿(n): (57)
If it so happens, but it would only be chance, that ￿(n) =
n
￿
, (??) is sat-
is￿ed, and consumption is then e¢ ciently allocated across generations.
7 Conclusion
We begun this paper by asking whether intergenerational cooperation
(a) is socially desirable, (b) will be realized by spontaneous agreement
at some level. The answer to (a) is obviously yes, the answer to (b) is
problematic. The literature reviewed shows that an economy consist-
ing of sel￿sh individuals coordinated only by the market would vanish
with the ￿rst generation, because the market does not provide such in-
dividuals with the incentive to have children. An economy consisting of
altruistic individuals coordinated only by the market may deliver an op-
timal population pro￿le, and allocate consumption e¢ ciently given that
pro￿le, but the conditions are rather strong. One is that parents are
rich and generous enough to make positive transfers (bequests) to their
grown-up children. The other is that credit is not rationed.
Cooperative behaviour at the level of the family may be generated
by a self-enforcing constitution, such that it is in the interest of each
family member to comply with it, and punish anyone who does not. For
it to be credible, such an arrangement must be renegotiation-proof, oth-
erwise any generation could set itself up as a constitutional assembly,
and modify the arrangement to its own advantage. A distinctive fea-
ture of these intra-family arrangements is that they guarantee support
for both the old and the young, but e¢ ciency is not guaranteed. The
idea can be transposed from the level of the family to that of society,
but enforcement becomes more and more problematic as the reference
population gets larger.
We also enquired whether there are policies that ￿in conjunction
with, or in an alternative to, the market and the family ￿would be ca-
pable of delivering a social optimum. Assuming that the government is
driven by ethical considerations, and does not have to answer to any con-
stituency (the ￿ benevolent dictator￿paradigm), the literature reviewed
shows that both the ￿rst and the second best policy include public trans-
fers to the old and to the young, interpretable as pensions and child
bene￿ts (or educational subsidies). The optimal policy reproduces, at
societal level, the workings of a family constitution.
In the absence of a benevolent dictator, intergenerational redistri-
bution requires some kind of political equilibrium. Economic-political
30models are of two kinds. Some assume direct democracy, in which case
they predict the behaviour of voters (essentially of the median one).
Others assume representative democracy, in which case they predict the
behaviour of politicians. Under direct democracy, a durable equilibrium
supporting a system of mandatory intergenerational transfers (such as an
unfunded pension system, or public debt) can come about only if it cre-
ates vested interests. Any such system will inevitably favour the genera-
tion or generations that voted for it in the ￿rst instance, at the expense
of the generations that come later. Rather than of intergenerational co-
operation, we should thus be talking of fait accompli. Representative
democracy weakens the link between policy and electorate. Policies af-
fecting the intergenerational distribution of resources re￿ ect the relative
political weight of di⁄erent age groups, rather than any ethical consid-
eration. Irrespective of whether democracy is direct or indirect, without
a society-wide constitutional arrangement governing transfers between
generations, voting is unlikely to produce intergenerational e¢ ciency and
social optimality.
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